

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

63

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/PAB:RAPECK/PDCONSTABLE/MW

APPROVED BY NEA - MR. SOBER

S/S:JLHOGANSON

C:WTSHINN (DRAFT)

EUR/SOV:RBARRY (DRAFT)

S: JCOVEY

----- 072634

P 260319Z AUG 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS3

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), PFOR, PK, US

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - NEW LETTER FROM BHUTTO

(S/S NO. 7516959

REF: A. STATE 201499 (TOSEC 10089), B. KABUL 5536

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SOBER THROUGH ATHERTON

1. THE PROBLEM

PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO HAS AGAIN WRITTEN THE PRESIDENT (REFTEL A) TO REGISTER DEEP CONCERN OVER ALLEGED SOVIET PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN. THIS LETTER IS CLOSELY RELATED TO TWO JUNE LETTERS FROM HIM TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. YOU HAVE ALREADY APPROVED, SUBJECT TO MINOR CHANGES, A BRIEF WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THESE EARLIER LETTERS ALONG WITH TALKING POINTS FOR USE BY AMBASSADOR BYROADE; THE TEXT OF A CABLE TO ISLAMABAD IS WITH YOUR PARTY (S/S NO. 75115991). WE HAVE MODIFIED THIS RESPONSE TO INCLUDE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

NEW LETTER, WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD RECEIVE A SEPARATE PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE AT A LATER DATE.

2. BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

THE UNDERLYING CONCERN OF ALL THREE LETTERS IS THAT PAKISTAN'S SECURITY IS THREATENED BY COMBINED SOVIET-INDIAN-

AFGHAN PRESSURE. IN THE TWO EARLIER LETTERS BHUTTO EMPLOYED A GARBLED ACCOUNT OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA TO IMPLY ENLARGED U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENTS TO PAKISTAN.

THIS TIME, BHUTTO ARGUES THAT THE RECENT HELSINKI ACCORD WILL PERMIT THE USSR TO PAY GREATER ATTENTION TO ASIA, AND PARTICULARLY TO PAKISTAN, PURSUING ITS GOAL OF A "SPHERE OF INFLUENCE" IN ASIA. BHUTTO CITES AS EVIDENCE STATEMENTS RECENTLY SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND DCM IN KABUL WHICH INDICATED THE USSR MIGHT BACK AN AFGHAN TERRITORIAL CLAIM ON PAKISTAN. (THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN KABUL HAS NOW VIGOROUSLY DENIED TO THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY THERE THAT HE MADE SUCH A STATEMENT--REF-TEL B). AFTER QUESTIONING THE VALUE OF USG STATEMENTS OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN, BHUTTO CONCLUDES: "THE LACK OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FROM THE U.S. ENCOURAGES THE SOVIET UNION TO EXPECT THAT THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF PAKISTAN WOULD COMPEL US TO MAKE READJUSTMENTS DEMANDED BY THE CHANGING POWER EQUILIBRIUM IN OUR REGION."

THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH PAKISTAN'S INTEREST IN EXPANDING THE MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WE RESUMED IN FEBRUARY. A "CREDIBLE EVIDENCE" OF U.S. SUPPORT, FROM THE PAKISTANI VIEWPOINT, WOULD PROBABLY INCLUDE COMBAT AIRCRAFT, TANKS AND FMS CREDITS, ALL OF WHICH WE HAVE SAID WE WERE NOT WILLING TO DISCUSS AT THIS TIME.

BHUTTO'S CONCLUSION MAY ALSO CONTAIN AN IMPLIED THREAT TO WITHDRAW FROM CENTO AND IS IN LINE WITH TWO RECENT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A MOVE WERE BEING STUDIED AT THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. IT
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

IS POSSIBLE THAT WITH THIS LETTER AND OTHER RECENT DEMARCHES TO US, BHUTTO IS CREATING A RECORD WHICH COULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE USED TO JUSTIFY WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTO SHOULD HE CHOOSE TO DO SO.

WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO RESPOND TO BHUTTO'S JUNE LETTERS TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING ON THE SUBJECT OF FORMAL U.S. COMMITMENTS TO PAKISTAN AND TO ESTABLISH A CLEAR RECORD ON THIS POINT. INASMUCH AS THE LATEST BHUTTO LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT RELATES TO THE SAME GENERAL SUBJECT, YOUR REPLY SHOULD ALSO TAKE NOTE OF IT. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, DEFER A PRESIDENTIAL REPLY TO THE LATEST LETTER, SO AS TO BE ABLE TO ASSESS MORE FULLY THE STATE OF PLAY REGARDING ACTUAL

SOVIET INTENTIONS. IF THE LATEST ASSESSMENT FROM PAKISTAN'S EMBASSY IN KABUL (REF B), DOWNPLAYING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET THREAT, COMES TO BE SHARED BY BHUTTO, THERE WILL BE LESS DIFFICULTY IN RESPONDING TO THE AUGUST 17 LETTER. WE HAVE THEREFORE DRAFTED A MODIFICATION OF THE EARLIER WRITTEN RESPONSE TO BHUTTO'S LETTERS: (1) TO ASSURE HIM THAT THE AUGUST 17 LETTER WILL RECEIVE CAREFUL ATTENTION AND (2) TO URGE BHUTTO TO KEEP US INFORMED VIA AMBASSADOR BYROADE OF THE SIGNIFICANCE HE ATTACHES TO THE REPORTED SOVIET STATEMENTS IN KABUL, IN LIGHT OF BHUTTO'S OWN EFFORTS TO SEEK SOVIET CLARIFICATION. WE HAVE ALSO ADDED TWO TALKING POINTS FOR AMBASSADOR BYROADE: (1) STATING THAT WE WOULD VIEW THE REPORTED SOVIET STATEMENTS WITH SERIOUS CONCERN IF THEY INDEED REPRESENT A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN AND (2) INDICATING THAT WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY IN KABUL THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAS CATEGORICALLY DENIED HE MADE SUCH STATEMENTS.

3. RECOMMENDATION:

THAT YOU SIGN THE ATTACHED CABLE TO ISLAMABAD INCLUDING A BRIEF WRITTEN RESPONSE TO BHUTTO ACKNOWLEDGING ALL THREE OF HIS LETTERS ALONG WITH TALKING POINTS FOR BYROADE.

4. THIS MEMO CLEARED BY EUR/SOV, AND C.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

5. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSED CABLE:

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO IN CONNECTION WITH HIS LETTERS OF JUNE 13 AND AUGUST 17.

QUOTE:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

THE PRESIDENT AND I WERE PLEASED TO HEAR FROM YOU IN YOUR LETTERS OF JUNE 13 REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS FOR PAKISTAN'S SECURITY. I HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR LETTERS IN DETAIL WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HE HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DEEPLY SYMPATHETIC TO YOUR CONCERNS. IT WAS WITH THESE IN MIND THAT THE PRESIDENT ORDERED THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN LAST FEBRUARY. WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP MEET YOUR FOOD AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE YEAR AHEAD' THIS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO ASSURE PAKISTAN'S CONTINUED SECURITY AND WELL-BEING. I HAVE ALSO

ASKED AMBASSADOR BYROADE TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS ON VARIOUS SPECIFIC POINTS YOU RAISED IN YOUR EARLIER LETTERS.

I HAVE NOW RECEIVED A COPY OF YOUR AUGUST 17 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, REEMPHASIZING YOUR CONCERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN KABUL. UPON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, I WILL DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH THE PRESIDENT. MEANWHILE, I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY ITS OFFICIALS IN KABUL, AND I HOPE YOU WILL KEEP AMBASSADOR BYROADE INFORMED. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END QUOTE

2. IN CONVEYING THE ABOVE MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

-- WE WERE PLEASED TO NOTE THE PRIME MINISTER'S EXPRESSION, IN HIS JUNE LETTERS, OF CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE SIMLA PROCESS. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THE WISE POLICIES OF CAUTION AND RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE GOP DURING THIS DELICATE PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES IN INDIA.

-- IT IS OUR VIEW THAT CONTINUED PROGRESS UNDER THE SIMLA PROCESS WILL REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED HOSTILITIES ON THE SUBCONTINENT. THE IMMEDIATE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ONE WHICH WE FULLY SHARE WITH PAKISTAN, IS TO AVERT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. IT WAS WITH THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND THAT THE SECRETARY CONVEYED TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN MAY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD REGARD AN INDIAN ATTACK AGAINST PAKISTAN. WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THIS QUESTION.

-- DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN A SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GRAVEST NATURE AND WOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES. THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE A MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR CONSTITUTION AND OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1959 MUTUAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN.

-- THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HOLD TALKS IN PEKING WITH LEADERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA LATER THIS YEAR. THESE TALKS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE FULL RANGE OF SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN

OUR COUNTRIES AND PAKISTAN, AND WAYS IN WHICH OUR GOVERNMENT MIGHT CONTINUE TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IN ITS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ITS SECURITY.

-- THE SECRETARY WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE THAT MR. AZIZ AHMED HAS COMMUNICATED TO THE CHINESE OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT WHICH THEIR PROPAGANDA HAS ON OUR ABILITY TO MOBILIZE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRC'S SECURITY.

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

-- IN DISCUSSING YOUR LETTERS IN WASHINGTON, I FOUND A DEEP AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ADMINISTRATION IN PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND WELFARE, AND A STRONG DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL IN WAYS THAT ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

-- AS I KNOW YOU ARE AWARE FROM YOUR OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH AMERICAN LEADERS, INCLUDING SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL FORMAL SECURITY COMMITMENTS, OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR FORMAL TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS.

-- WITH REGARD TO THE RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO PAKISTANI OFFICIALS IN KABUL CONCERNING THE DURAND LINE, IF THESE IN FACT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN, WE WOULD OF COURSE VIEW THEM WITH GRAVE CONCERN.

-- WE UNDERSTAND FROM YOUR EMBASSY IN KABUL THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THERE HAS NOW CLAIMED THAT HIS STATEMENTS MUST HAVE BEEN INCORRECTLY TRANSLATED BY THE INTERPRETER AND HAS DENIED MAKING ANY THREATS AGAINST PAKISTAN. WE WILL BE INTERESTED TO HAVE YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON THE SOVIET POSITION, GIVEN THIS DENIAL AND YOUR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.

3. IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ABOVE, YOU SHOULD SEEK TO CORRECT THE DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN WHAT I SAID TO AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA ON MAY 22 AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THESE REMARKS CONTAINED IN BHUTTO'S LETTERS OF JUNE 13. THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE MADE SO THAT THE RECORD WILL BE CLEAR:

-- DURING MY WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, I REVIEWED THE MINUTES OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. OUR RECORD CONTAINS SOME IMPORTANT NUANCES WHICH, IF NOT PRECISELY GRASPED, COULD LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WE BOTH WANT TO AVOID.

-- THE SECRETARY INFORMED AZIZ AHMED HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE USE

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

MADE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT ANYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY IN PAKISTAN.

(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER INFORMED MR. AHMED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO...GROMYKO IN VERY STRONG TERMS TO THE EFFECT THAT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD INVITE A RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES.")

-- THE SECRETARY ASKED AZIZ AHMED IF WE COULD ASK THE CHINESE WHAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IF PAKISTAN IS ATTACKED. THE SECRETARY ALSO INDICATED THAT A GENERAL WAR FOLLOWING AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN AND INVOLVING THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WHOLE OF ASIA AND FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE AREA.

(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY STATES: "...I WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR FROM MR. AZIZ AHMED...WHAT YOU PLANNED TO TELL THE CHINESE ABOUT THE ACTION THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA FOR COMING TO PAKISTAN'S ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN." BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER...ADDED THAT, IF CHINA POSED THE COUNTERQUESTION AS TO WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN SUCH AN EVENT (AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN), IT WOULD BE INFORMED THAT IF INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND CHINA CAME TO ITS HELP AND IF IN CONSEQUENCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA, THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF THAT SITUATION.)

INGERSOLL

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, BRIEFING MATERIALS, CAT-C
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 AUG 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: WorrelSW
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE202508
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA/PAB:RAPECK/PDCONSTABLE/MW
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS3
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P850036-2498, N750003-0468
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197508102/baaaatbx.tel
Line Count: 308
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: WorrelSW
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <14 MAY 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <09 OCT 2003 by WorrelSW>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, PK, US, (KISSINGER, HENRY A), (BHUTTO, ALI)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006